We consider the problem of a seller who faces an unknown number of offers where each offer is a random draw from a known distribution. The objective of the seller is to maximize the probability that the highest offer is chosen. This is equivalent to maximizing expected utility when one assigns preferences to rankings of offers. We identify the optimal selling strategy using the technique of Porosiński (1987) and general optimal stopping theory. We show that the optimal strategy is characterized by a non-increasing stochastic set of reservation prices. This is in contrast to the classical search theory models where reservation prices are deterministic. Our analysis also provides theoretical support to the observation that first offers in residential real estate markets should be accepted more often since they tend to be higher than subsequent offers.
Introduction
Consider the problem of a home seller who expects to receive an unknown number of offers on her house. When an offer arrives, the seller must either accept it, in which case the search process stops, or reject it and wait for a new offer. If the seller rejects the offer, another offer may or may not arrive, and if a new offer arrives it might be higher or smaller than the current offer.
Furthermore, the seller is not able to go back and choose a previously rejected offer. Deciding whether or not it is optimal to accept an offer in such an environment is a complicated task.
The standard approach in the literature has been to utilize the optimal stopping rule where the seller incurs a search cost to obtain a new offer and rejects the offer if the value of continued search exceeds the cost of search. However, most home sellers hire a broker to help them sell their property. The broker typically incurs the search costs and conducts the search process on behalf of the seller. If there is a successful transaction, the seller owes the broker a percentage of the transaction price as commission. Since the commission is not a function of the number of buyers contacted or the number of bids received, the seller is often not concerned with the cost of obtaining another bid. In fact, the seller would rather have as many buyers contacted and as many bids obtained as possible.
In this paper, we recognize this important aspect of the home selling process and model the seller's objective as maximizing the probability of accepting the highest bid. That is, the seller's problem is to maximize the probability that the offer she chooses is higher than the offers she has rejected and higher than the offers she might have received if she continued the search process. This objective is equivalent to maximizing expected utility when one assigns preferences to rankings of offers. More specifically, the owner of the property receives U i units of utility if the accepted item is the i-th best of all that are offered; additionally, the units of utility U i are non increasing in the ranking i. Our analysis focuses upon the special case U 1 = 1, U j = 0, j ≥ 2 with a goal of maximizing the seller's expected utility. This corresponds to a seller's objective of following a strategy which accepts the highest offer (relative to all others) with the greatest probability. Evidence from real estate markets indicates that sellers adjust listing prices so as to maximize sale prices. Prior to further adjustments enacted to induce offer frequency and/or distribution changes, sellers wish to pick the largest offer presented to them. Following such a strategy, sellers are interested in how a current offer compares to both previous and future offers. In this way, past offers can act as a reference point for judging the attractiveness of a current offer which is reminiscent of modified expected utility theory.
The alternative preference structure and objective we analyze provides an optimal strategy which closely resembles observed seller behavior of "past offer regret" within behavioral economic theory. This suggests that our setup might be able to be embedded within modified expected utility theory such as prospect theory. In Appendix A, we analyze this conjecture using a simple model within our framework and show that our perspective embraces the observable behavioral tendencies of prospect theory and yet is outside its purview.
Our model captures another important feature of the search process by making the number of bids received stochastic. The seller has to decide whether to accept or reject an offer without knowing whether another offer would arrive. This is a departure from standard search models in the real estate literature where the seller can obtain another bid by incurring a search cost.
Modifying the standard approach to capture this realistic aspect of the seller's problem makes the current analysis much more complicated than the standard search models. In this paper, we take up this challenge and derive the optimal strategy for a seller who faces an uncertain number of buyers as well as a random bid that a buyer may offer.
In this more complicated set up, we are still able to solve for a simple optimal strategy for the seller. A distinguishing feature of our optimal strategy is its stochastic nature. In classical search theory, the optimal strategy is characterized by a deterministic non-increasing (in bids) set of reservation prices which dictate levels at or above which a bid is acceptable. Within our framework, we find that acceptable bids cannot simply be characterized as those above a certain deterministic number. Rather, bids also need to be examined in relation to each other when determining if a given bid should be accepted. To be more precise, the optimal decision to accept a bid requires not only that the bid exceeds a certain threshold level, but it also needs to be greater than all past (random) bids received. In addition, we are able to calculate the probability of accepting the highest offer (among offers received and were to be received if current offer rejected), estimate a confidence interval for this probability and show how it changes as the seller rejects an offer and waits for the arrival of a new offer. We also show that if an improvement in market conditions leads to a rise in the expected number of bids, this can lead to a decrease as well as an increase in the probability of a sale.
The likelihood of future bids in real estate markets depends upon many factors such as the availability of financing, prevailing interest rates, income per capita, unemployment rate, supply of new units, property taxes etc. In our analysis, we are able to incorporate the impact of such uncertain factors and examine their impact on the seller's optimal strategy. Within our framework, we also specifically incorporate anecdotal evidence that first bids on real estate property tend to be larger than subsequent bids. A possible explanation for such a phenomenon might be that a newly listed property attracts the attention of all the buyers in the market whereas a property that has been listed for some time only attracts the attention of new buyers entering the market. Another possible reason might be the signal that prospective home buyers may infer about the quality of the property from the amount of time it spends on the market, according to which the interest in the property will decline as the property stays longer (Taylor (1999) ). In contrast to the classical search model literature, we provide a solution for the optimal selling strategy which does not rule out the presence of distributionally different first bids from all subsequent bids. In fact, for an objective of maximizing the probability that the seller accepts the largest of all bids offered, the optimal strategy in this non independent and identically distributed case (non-idd) is precisely the same as the strategy for the classical (iid) case, i.e., the reservation prices are identical in both cases. A direct consequence of this fact is that first bids will be optimally accepted with greater likelihood if they are in fact distributionally superior (e.g., the median of the first bid distribution exceeds the median of subsequent bids) rather than identical. The empirical findings of Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) that more than seventy percent of the properties sell to the first potential buyer making an offer on the property supports this prediction of our model. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides motivation of our model as a variation of the classical secretary problem. Section 3 discusses the model and optimal strategy for our selling problem. Section 4 presents numerical results pertaining to the Gamma distribution for bid sizes and the Poisson distribution for the number of bids. Here, we approximate threshold strategies associated to the optimal selling policy and discuss distributional properties of the optimal policy. Section 5 concludes the paper. Finally, we include an appendix containing some technical aspects regarding the optimal policy along with numerical results when the distribution of the bid size is either uniform or one-point distributed.
Background
The problem of deciding when to accept a given offer for an asset can be viewed as a variation of what is known as the secretary problem in probability theory (see Freeman (1983) ). The standard secretary problem can be stated as follows: A fixed number of items n are to be presented to an observer one by one in random order with all n! possible orders being equally likely. Each item is comparable to any other and as each item is presented, the observer must decide whether to accept it or not. If the observer accepts an item, then the process stops. If the observer rejects the item, then the next item in the sequence is presented and the observer faces the same choice as before. If the last item is presented, it must be accepted. The observer's aim is to find an optimal acceptance policy.
The seller of real estate faces a similar problem to this classically motivated problem. Over time, perspective buyers present offers in sequence to purchase the property and the seller must decide if it is acceptable or not. If the seller feels that the offer is too low (based upon valuations, perspective future offers etc), they will reject the bid in favor of waiting for a better offer. However, if the offer meets an appropriately determined threshold level (reservation price), then the offer will be accepted and the property will be sold. A simple model for this problem corresponds to the seller drawing from n independently distributed random offers in sequence and deciding after each draw whether or not to accept the offer. When bids are observed sequentially from a known distribution, the problem is said to have "full information". Early work on optimal behavior in this full information setting was carried out by Guttman (1960) . Guttman (1960) found the stopping rule yielding the largest expected payoff when there are at most n (fixed, known) choices. Further, each independent selection was drawn from a common, general distribution function. This analysis by Guttman (1960) served as a direct extension of a similar analysis carried out for the uniform distribution by Moser (1956) . Similar to both Guttman (1960) and Moser (1956) , our analysis to follow also seeks an optimal stopping time except with a modified objective. In our analysis, we seek a stopping time which maximizes the probability of accepting the largest bid. Our setting is more general than Guttman (1960) in that we allow for a random number of bids and consider the possibility that all bids are not identically distributed.
In our analysis to follow, we will operate exclusively within the "full information" setting and analyze our real estate problem with a random number of bids. In order to capture both the notion that "first offers tend to be larger than later bids" and the uncertain number of bids a property may receive, we will suppose that the distributions of the first bid can be different from all other bids and the number of bids is random. This setting and objective most closely resembles the optimal stopping problem solved in Porosiński (1987) . The important difference between Porosiński (1987) and our present work is that we do not assume all bids to be identically distributed. In what follows, we will show that calculating the optimal selling strategy in this context is no different than in the iid setting of Porosiński (1987) .
As we have mentioned, differences in bid distributions is a key feature of our model. Such heterogeneity of bid distributions within the model presents interesting research questions re-lated to estimation of bid distributions. Although this is not our focus in the present analysis, it is worth mentioning two papers related to the estimation of bid distributions within classical models: Tryfos (1981) and Brown and Brown (1986) . Firstly, Tryfos (1981) develops a procedure by which the distribution of bids may be estimated on the basis of a sample of real estate transactions recording the asking price, the selling price and the physical characteristics of the properties sold. Secondly, Brown and Brown (1986) develop a methodology based on order statistics for estimating the parameters of the bid distribution which has not yet been placed on the market.
Model Setup and Solution
Up through the present, the most common approach for solving the real estate selling problem has been to utilize the job search theory. This literature was initiated by Stigler (1961) and was subsequently developed and discussed by many including Lippman and McCall (1976) , Lancaster and Chesher (1983) , van den Berg (1990) etc. Overall, the job search theory applies optimal stopping theory to investigate how many searches an unemployed person should undertake before accepting a job when search has a cost; e.g., time, lost wages. Applying this theory to the real estate selling problem, we have the following model: Suppose offers arrive for a real estate asset where X n denotes the amount of the offer received at time n. For simplicity, assume offers arrive independently and all have the same distribution which is known to the seller. Further, search incurs a unit cost c > 0. When the seller receives an offer, she must decide whether to accept it or wait for a better offer. The criteria for deciding whether or not to accept an offer is determined by finding the strategy which maximizes the expected payoff from the sale of the asset over all possible random selling times, i.e., Y n = X n − nc, n = 1, 2, . . . .
(JS)
An investigation into this optimal stopping problem yields an explicit optimal strategy (i.e., a strategy which attains the optimal expected value above) of the form,
for some calculated value r(n). In the literature, r(n) is known as the reservation price at time n since it denotes the smallest offer that will be accepted. The optimal strategy is to accept an offer for period n if the offer is greater than or equal to the reservation price for period n.
Our analysis to follow seeks to depart from the usual job search methodology in several important ways. First, there is anecdotal evidence that the first offer for a real estate asset tends to be the highest. This observation suggests that the distribution of the first offer X 1 is fundamentally different from all other offers. This lies in contrast to the classical job search
iid assumption for bids X n , n = 1, 2, . . .. Next, it is more realistic to believe that the number of bids that arrive for the real estate asset is not known beforehand as opposed to the usual assumptions of a known fixed number such as N = 1, 2, . . . , ∞. For example, the number of bids N often depends upon many factors such as: the time of year, the quality of the asset, the state of the overall economy, the time on the market etc and is not simply available upon payment of cost c > 0 for each additional bid. Finally, given the anecdotal evidence that first offers tend to be largest and a clear desire of a seller to develop a strategy to exploit this, we decide to shift the objective of the seller away from the optimal strategy which maximizes, on average, the net payoff Y τ * = X τ * − τ * c in favor of one which maximizes the probability that the highest offer is chosen. Thus, we replace the usual objective function (JS) of the job search model with one that emphasizes the importance of choosing the largest bid made to the seller.
As indicated earlier, this objective function for the seller is particularly more appropriate for sellers in real estate markets who often hire a real estate broker to carry out the search process and incur the search costs of contacting potential buyers. The primary search cost for the seller is the brokerage commission that she has to pay, and this commission is independent of the number of offers received and does not change depending on whether or not an offer is accepted (whether the brokerage fee is incurred is, of course, contingent on a sale) 1 .
Our analysis below operates in discrete time, i.e., t = 1, 2, . . .. At each point in time, the seller knows whether or not there is an offer and can decide to accept it or not. If the seller turns down an offer, she cannot recall it later and it may be the last offer presented for the property. The seller learns whether or not a particular offer was the last one to be offered exactly one time unit after she rejected the offer. The goal for the seller is to identify a criteria for accepting a particular offer as the selling problem evolves. Given this brief description, we now mathematically ground this model. We assume the following conditions hold.
Assumption 1.
(1) the offer bids X 1 ∼ F 1 , X i ∼ F, i ≥ 1 make up a sequence of independent random variables with continuous cumulative distribution functions defined on the probability space (Ω, F, P); where Ω is the probability sample space, P is the probability measure on Ω, and F is the collection of sets (σ-algebra) for which we can determine the P-probability. Further, we assume that the support of the bid distributions are identical for all bids. Finally, all bids is bounded from below by R > 0, i.e, X i > R with probability one for all i ≥ 1.
(2) the number of observations N is a random variable independent of the sequence
with a known distribution,
Assumption 1 captures the notion that the first bid is distributionally different from subsequent bids. The additional assumption that the support of each distribution is bounded from below by R is not required for solving the objective problem stated below. We add this additional requirement in order incorporate the realistic notion of a minimally acceptable sale price.
Namely, we assume that the seller has a price R > 0 such that they will not go below when selling the real estate. That is, R represents the price below which the seller prefers holding the property than selling it. Hence R captures the utility that the seller will derive from the property if the property does not get sold. Given this, offers which are below R will not even be considered qualified bids for the sale of the real estate. For this reason, we assume bids are bounded from below by R. Additionally, Assumption 1 allows us to consider the situation in sellers who hire brokers and simply pay a commission upon sale.
which the number of bids N is a random variable with a known distribution. Notice that since N is random, the seller faces an additional risk; if they reject any bid, they may then discover that it was the last one, in which case the opportunity to sell the property is lost.
Notice that in Assumption 1, we still retain independence between bids. While leaving an analysis of the non-independent case to future research, here we incorporate our motivating observation between first bids and all others to follow through our distributional assumption on the bids. We take the point of view that bidders do not have information about previous bid amounts when making an offer.
2 Rather, the reality that a particular bid is not the first bid means that it comes from a different prescribed distribution.
The goal of our analysis is to identify a criteria (or rule) used to evaluate whether a currently presented bid should be accepted or not. An example of such a rule might be the following:
(1) Accept the first offer if it is at least as much as x 1 ; otherwise do not accept the first offer.
(2) If we do not accept the first offer, then accept the second offer if it is at least as much as x 2 ; otherwise do not accept the second offer. . . .
If this were an appropriate rule, how might x i compare to x j for i < j? If we reject an offer X i because X i < x i , then this means we are expecting to observe X j > X i , for j > i, even if future bids tend to be worse on average. If X j does, indeed, satisfy X j > X i , should we be pickier than before in accepting the offer? Recall that since the number of bids N is unknown, we face the added risk that if we reject X j , it may be last one, for which we would receive nothing at all in the end. This suggests that we should not be pickier than we were at time i. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that x i ≥ x j , i.e., the threshold values {x i } are non-increasing. Indeed, we will find this is satisfied by the optimal criteria.
In classifying a criterion for accepting a bid, we can use stopping times. A stopping time τ will indicate a strategy for accepting or rejecting bids since it will denote the random time in which the criteria for acceptance has been satisfied. Hence, the goal of our analysis is to identify the form of the optimal stopping time.
Let T be the set of all stopping times with respect to the information (i.e., filtration)
, and 1 A denotes the indicator random variable of the event A. In other words, 1 A = 1 when the outcome of the experiment is an element of A (i.e., ω ∈ A) and 1 A = 0 when it is not (i.e., ω / ∈ A). In our context, the events correspond to {N = 0}, {N = 1}, . . . , {N = n − 1}. Notice how information flows in our model: At n, the seller knows all n − 1 previous bid amounts and knows whether or not the total number of bids is equal to 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Thus, if the seller turns down a bid at time n − 1, then at n she knows whether or not this was the last bid to be offered. Hence, if the seller finds out at n, after having turned down n − 1 bids, that there will be no more bids, then she cannot sell the house.
Given the above framework, the goal for our seller is to explicitly identify a stopping time
By definition, τ * satisfying (P) maximizes the probability of the event that both the seller decides to sell the property at or before the last bid arrives (τ ≤ N ) and this time selling time τ corresponds to a bid X τ which is largest of all the possible arrival bids (max {X 1 , . . . , X N }).
Note that if the distribution of the first offer is the same as the distribution of other offers, F 1 ≡ F , then using continuity of F , (P) is without loss of generality equal to
where
. . is a uniformly distributed random variable over [0, 1] . Recall, the uniform distribution over [0, 1] appears above since: if F X denotes the cumulative distribution function of X, it holds that F −1 Porosiński (1987) , we can frame (P) as an optimal stopping problem for a particular Markov chain which, in turn, allows us to use well-established machinery (see e.g. Shiryaev (2008)) to solve the problem. We begin with a reduction of (P) to a classically defined optimal stopping problem of a Markov chain.
Reduction to classical optimal stopping
We define a stochastic process Z which will assist us in rewriting our objective function (P) as a classical optimal stopping time problem. Let Z n := P(N ≥ n, X n = max{X 1 , . . . , X N }|F n ), for n ≥ 1. We have,
and set Z ∞ := 0. In words, the above deductions separate out, when the n-th bid arrives, the event that the current bid X n is the maximum among the first n bids from the rest of the conditional probability of the current bid being the maximum of all N bids. This decomposition is useful in obtaining the optimal strategy since it effectively separates the known information at the n-th bid (answering the question "is the n-th bid the largest of all previous bids") from the probability that the n-th bid is the largest going forward.
We will focus our search for an optimal stopping time to those which correspond to possible best choices given up-to-the-present information. Namely,
and define for i ∈ N,
is a homogenous Markov chain with respect to (
Thus, the transition function for Y is
For any τ ∈ T 0 , we define a stopping time σ with respect to (
as follows: Set σ = i on {τ = τ i < ∞}, i ∈ N, and set σ = ∞ on {τ = ∞}. Then,
and f 0 (δ) = 0 (since Y ∞ = δ by definition). Hence, we have reduced (P) to the problem of optimally stopping a Markov chain Y with reward function f 0 . In other words, our problem (P) can be equivalently stated as
Find the stopping time τ * satisfying
where E (n,x) denotes the expected value with respect to P (n,x) (·) = p(n, x; ·). From the general theory of optimal stopping (see Shiryaev (2008) ), it is known that s 0 (n, x) satisfies s 0 (n, x) = max{f 0 (n, x), P 0 s 0 (n, x)}, where
for a bounded function h : E → R. If we assume that h(δ) = 0, then P 0 h(δ) = 0 and from (1),
we have
Within this optimal stopping setup, we can now present the main theorem.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds and the monotone condition 3 is satisfied, then the solution to (P) exists and the stopping time
is optimal for (P) where x n is the least root of the equation k(n, x) = 0 in [R, ∞), for each n ∈ N. The value k(n, x) represents the difference between the probability that the n-th bid amount x is largest and the probability that a later bid is largest (see equation (12)).
Corollary 1. As in Theorem 1, suppose Assumption 1 holds and the monotone condition holds.
The sequence of values x i , i ≥ 1 associated to the optimal stopping time τ * in equation (3) are non-increasing.
The details of the proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are discussed in Appendix B. Here, we proceed with a discussion concerning the hypotheses of the theorem and an analysis of the form and implications of the solution strategy τ * .
Notice that in addition to Assumption 1, Theorem 1 requires a monotone condition to be satisfied. The nature of the monotone condition itself is very much linked to the connectedness of the stopping region in time (i.e., bid values for which selling is optimal). In words, connectedness in time refers to the intuitive idea that any reasonable model of our selling problem which identifies an optimal criteria to conclude that if the i-th bid X i = x is large enough to accept, then it should also conclude that X j = x is large enough to accept if j > i, since there are "fewer" bids left at j as opposed to i. The monotone condition enforces this intuitive behavior to hold. In order to make sure monotonicity is satisfied, we restrict the distribution choice for the number of bids N . Specifically, we verify in Appendix B.1 that this condition holds when we assume Assumption 1 and suppose N has One-point{n}, Uniform{1, . . . , n}, or Poisson(λ)
distributions. For numerical examples, we consider the case when N ∼ Poisson(λ) in our main discussion and present results for the one-point and uniform cases in Appendix C.
The form of the optimal strategy is very similar to the strategy discussed at the beginning of the section. Recall, τ * identifies the time at which it is optimal to accept the present bid and it involves satisfying two important criteria. The first condition is that τ * can only be a time for which X τ * = max{X 1 , . . . , X τ * }. In other words, if we want to maximize the probability that we accept the largest of all bids presented, we should not accept a bid if it is smaller than any bid already presented and rejected. This part of the criteria is a backward-observing one. Not surprisingly, the second condition is a forward-observing one which identifies when it is optimal to not proceed any further with bid observations. In other words, it is a criteria identifying when the value of accepting the present bid outweighs the expected value of observing future bids.
The roots of the equations k(n, x n ) = 0, namely, x 1 , . . . , x N make up the forward-observing part of the optimal policy τ * .
The second condition appearing in the optimal strategy τ * is characterized by a sequence of
. These values demark the smallest bid amounts for which the forwardobserving criteria is satisfied. Often times, these values are also referred to as indifference numbers since the probability of obtaining the largest bid amount with this number is equal to the probability of obtaining the largest bid later when the best strategy is used.
Perhaps the best way to offer intuition for the result of Theorem 1 is to walk through the solution in the special case when N ∼ one-point{n}. This special case was completely solved by Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) . For simplicity, suppose bids arrive independently and are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, i.e., Unif [0, 1] . Consider the situation where there are two total bids and there is one bid yet to be presented. Further suppose that the current value being considered is x 1 . Whatever the value of x 1 might be, the probability that the final bid is the largest is equal to 1 = F (x 1 ) = 1 − x 1 where F (·) is the cdf of Unif [0, 1] . Additionally, the probability that x 1 is the largest of the two bids is F (x 1 ) = x 1 . Thus, the value of x 1 which equates these two probabilities satisfies
. Thus, a bid value of x 1 = 1 2 makes the seller indifferent between accepting x 1 and waiting for the final bid. We call x 1 = 1 2 the threshold or indifference value corresponding to the first bid X 1 under the optimal policy.
With this in mind, now suppose there are three total bids, two of which have yet to be presented and the current bid has value x 1 . Similar as before, we can construct an indifference relation equating the probability that x 1 is the largest of all three bids and the probability that the largest bid is found later using the optimal strategy. The probability that x 1 is the largest of all three bids is x 2 1 since P[X 2 ≤ x 1 ] = P[X 3 ≤ x 1 ] = x 1 and each event occurs independent of the other. Continuing, the probability that the largest is found later using the optimal strategy can be broken up into two parts: P[largest found later using opt. strat.] = P[X 2 ≥ X 3 and X 2 ≥ x 1 ] + P[X 2 < x 1 and X 3 ≥ x 1 ]. (4) Notice that in the second term we have the event [X 2 < x 1 and X 3 ≥ x 1 ] and not [X 2 < 1 2 and X 3 ≥ x 1 ]. Even though we determined the indifference value to be 1 2
for X 2 , we should not necessarily accept any value satisfying X 2 ≥ 1 2
. Accepting any such value would not maximize the probability of receiving the largest out of three bids because the first bid's value is already known to be x. As such, having rejected x, we should only accept X 2 if it is at least as large as x and if it is also greater than . This policy reduces to simply accepting X 2 if it is at least as large as x 1 since we are seeking a solution to equation (4) is due to the fact that with more bids there is a greater chance of getting the largest bid later, i.e., thresholds should decrease in time. Upon computing the probabilities on the right hand side of (4), we have the following indifference equation:
which, in turn, implies a threshold value x 1 ≈ 0.6898. If we continue this reasoning when there are n = i + 1 total bids (i.e. i remaining to be presented) and the current bid is x 1 , we obtain the indifference equation for the (n − i) th bid:
If we let k(n − i, x) :
j , then we must solve k(n − i, x) = 0 for x to determine the threshold value x n−i . The function k(n − i, ·) corresponds to the function which appears in Theorem 1 when N has a one-point distribution, i.e., N ∼ one-point{n} and the bids (X i ) are iid uniformly distributed over [0, 1] .
and the backward-observing condition
together constitute the reservation prices within this model.
Remark 2. The reservation price at each point in time is stochastic, which is a departure from the search theory literature where the reservation price is a deterministic value.
Remark 3. The threshold values x 1 , . . . , x N are forward-observing; their values when X 1 ∼ F 1 = F are identical to those obtained when X i ∼ F for i ≥ 1. As such, the threshold values x i , i ≥ 1 in this non idd case are the same as in the case when X i ∼ F, i ≥ 1.
The intuition for Remark 3 is simple: The indifference equation compares the likelihood that the present bid is the largest with the likelihood that a larger bid is optimally chosen later. In other words, the distribution of X 1 has no bearing on this calculation. Nonetheless, as will be shown later in the paper, having a different distribution for the first bid does affect the probability of retaining the highest bid. The reason for this is purely due to the fact that the distribution of X 1 affects the likelihood of satisfying the stochastic reservation price for the first bid.
By the structure of the optimal stopping strategy in (3), we see that the random value of the reservation price at each time is a direct result of the nature of our objective, i.e., maximizing the probability of retaining the highest bid. In a standard search model of housing markets, the reservation price at time t is deterministic and can be calculated at time zero. In contrast, in the current model, the reservation price at time t depends upon the realization of the random draw of the bid at time t − 1.
The non-increasing property of the threshold values (Corollary 1) in our model is in line with the predictions of earlier search models of housing markets (e.g., Miller and Sklarz (1986); Salant (1991) ; Yavas and Yang (1995); and Knight (2002) ). It is also consistent with the majority of empirical studies on the relationship between price and Time-On-the-Market (TOM) in residential real estate markets. In their review of this literature, Sirmans, Macpherson, and Zietz (2005) conclude that the correlation between price and Time-On-the-Market is generally negative which, in turn, suggests a non-increasing sequence of price thresholds. This threshold behavior is a feature of our model which incorporates an unknown number of bids and allows first bids to be distributionally different from subsequent bids. Similarly, according to Remark 3, having a different distribution for first bids also does not impact the threshold values.
As pointed out before, the findings in Remark 2 and Remark 3 are new under two important features of our model: a modified objective of maximizing the probability of obtaining the largest bid and a different distribution of first bids than subsequent bids.
Model Simulation
In this section, we carry out a numerical implementation of the selling model developed in Section 3 in order to highlight some interesting contrasts and comparisons to those of the classical search model.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the model we consider is the stochastic nature of the reservation prices. In classical search theory, reservation prices are non-increasing values which do not change irrespective of the outcome of the experiment. In other words, if the reservation price in classical search theory is $70 when the second bid arrives, then any offer at or above $70 will be accepted. This is not the case in our model. Instead, even though the threshold values are deterministic, acceptance only occurs if the bid is both at or above the threshold and it is at least as large as the first bid. Such a criterion can only be determined on an outcome-by-outcome basis.
A numerical implementation of our model also provides an instructive setting for examining the optimal strategy when first bids are not probabilistically identical to subsequent bids. From
Remark 3, we know that the threshold values are identical to the iid case. A direct consequence of this fact is that first bids will be optimally accepted with greater (resp. lower) probability if these bids are indeed higher (resp. lower). In keeping with anecdotal evidence, we decide to carry out a numerical implementation directly incorporating the tendency of first bids to be larger than subsequent ones.
To begin, we will assume that the number of bids follow N ∼ Poisson(λ) and the distribution of the bids satisfies: X 1 ∼ Gamma(4, 4, 1, 70) and X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 2.
The probability density function for the generalized gamma distribution Gamma(α, β, γ, µ)
is proportional to pdf of Gamma(α, β, γ, µ)
, for x > µ, and 0 elsewhere. 
Threshold values:
x n . Table 1 presents the threshold numbers x 1 , . . . , x 7 associated to the optimal policy τ * . For example, when N ∼ Poisson(λ = 4), we find that x 1 = 81.2804, x 2 = 79.4138, . . . , x 7 = 70.
These values can be calculated using a root solving numerical routine with the function k(n, x) defined as (12) in the Appendix. More specifically, optimal decision values x n in the table were obtained by interpolating the function k(n, ·) using 20 values equally spaced in the interval (0, 1].
The interpolation function was constructed in Mathematica using the built-in "Interpolation" function. Once the interpolation function was constructed, the zero of this function was found using the "FindRoot" function call in Mathematica. Finally, we send this calculated value through the inverse of the Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70) distribution in order to obtain x 1 , . . . , x 7 for each row.
Entries of the table correspond to the threshold value x i corresponding to the i-th bid. Each row corresponds to a different assumption for the parameter λ associated to the mean number Note that 70 is the minimum value for any bid in this numerical example. Therefore, a threshold value of 70 corresponds to an acceptance policy which only requires that the current bid be the largest of all prior bids. It is also worth noting that when the arrival rate of offers λ increases, without changing the distribution of valuations for the buyers, there is a significant increase in the threshold price. As λ increases from 1 to 5, the seller's threshold price for the first bid arrived increases by 18% (70 vs 82.6872). This illustrates how sensitive prices can be to a change in the number of potential buyers in the market, even when a larger number of potential buyers do not mean more willingness of each buyer to pay a higher price for the property. The results of Table 1 also coincide with the empirical data of Merlo and OrtaloMagné (2004) who report that the sale price of the house increases with the number of matches in the transaction history of the house.
Thus, we obtain a simple decision rule for the seller. If, for instance, the arrival rate of bids is λ = 5 (last row of Table 1 ) and bids are distributed according to X 1 ∼ Gamma(4, 4, 1, 70), X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 2, then the optimal strategy for the seller is to accept the first bid if it exceeds 82.6872. Otherwise, reject the first offer and only accept the second offer (if it arrives) if it both exceeds 81.2515 and it is at least as large as the first bid. Otherwise, reject the second offer and accept the third offer (if it arrives) if it both exceeds 79.5906 and is the largest among the three presented offers, . . . , and so on. The prediction of our model that the threshold values decline from bid i to bid i + 1 is supported by the empirical finding in Anenberg (2012) that most sellers adjust their listing price downwards, and only six percent of list prices are changed upwards.
As shown in Table 1 , the threshold values x i are deterministic. These values can be calculated before any bids arrive. However, unlike in standard search models, the reservation prices here are not deterministic. Rather, they are stochastic because of the backwards-observing component of the reservation price. Recall that the reservation price in the current model satisfies:
X i ≥ x i and X i = max{X 1 , . . . , X i } where X i = max{X 1 , . . . , X i } is the backwards-observing component and X i is randomly drawn. 
Probability of Success with Optimal Strategy
The current model also allows us to calculate the probability that the seller accepts the largest bid given she uses the optimal strategy. In what follows, we will call the event that the seller accepts the largest bid to be offered, a 'win'. Recalling that p n = P(N = n), the law of total probability yields
P n (k), where P n (k) = P(win at k-th observation|N = n).
Since we are assuming N ∼ Poisson(λ), we know p n and only must calculate P n (k), k = 1, . . . , n.
For this, we can use the reasoning outlined in the proof of Theorem 4 in Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) .
Let f 1 , f denote the probability density functions for bid X 1 , X i , i ≥ 2. Note
where R here represents the minimal acceptable bid; for example, in our numerical exercise above we consider R = 70. In general, P n (1) is the probability that the first draw is largest minus the probability that the first draw is largest and all draws are less than x 1 . We now compute P 2 (2). This quantity is equal to the probability that X 1 is not chosen and X 2 is the largest value minus the probability that we do not take X 2 and it is largest. Notice that we are using the fact that the threshold values x i are non-increasing in i. This is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B.2. Thus, we have
The same reasoning used for the probability decomposition in P 2 (2) can be used to calculate P n (k) for fixed n and k = 2, . . . , n. Indeed, P n (k) is equal to the probability that no bid among the first k − 1 is accepted and that the largest bid occurs at k minus the probability that we do not take bid k and it is the largest. Table 2 provides a lower bound for the probability of 'winning' using the optimal strategy by calculating four terms (of the infinite sum) appearing in equation (6). Entries in the table correspond to the probability P n (i), where n refers to the row and i refers to the column. For example, P 3 (2) is equal to 0.0946, and it indicates that there is a 9.46% probability that the seller accepts the second bid and it is largest bid given that there are 3 total bids. After computing P n (k); k = 1, . . . , n; n = 1, 2, 3, 4, a lower bound for the probability of accepting the largest bid using the optimal strategy is computed to be 0.4754.
This value appears in the first row of the second column in Table 2 . This value indicates that there is at least a 47.54% probability of accepting the largest bid using the optimal strategy.
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Note that there is a very sharp decline in the probability of obtaining the largest bid from the first offer to the second offer, P n (1) versus P n (2), once again complementing the conventional wisdom that first bids tend to be higher than all of the bids that follow.
The algorithm provided above gives us an "exact" method for determining the probability of success using the optimal strategy τ * , i.e., compute P(win using τ * ). Notice, however, that this calculation requires an infinite number of rows and columns with each entry coming from 5 The reason we only provide a lower bound here is due to the fact that the Poisson distribution takes on all non-negative integers with non-zero probability. Table 2 includes four terms of this infinite sum which suffices to bolster intuition about the behavior of the optimal strategy. When N has a distribution with finite support, the above algorithm yields exact calculations for P(win). More specifically, Section C.1.2 and Section C.2.2 of the appendix provide probabilities of success using this optimal strategy when N ∼ One-point{n} and N ∼ Unif{1, . . . , n}, respectively. n P(win) > 0.4754 P n (1) P n (2) P n (3) P n (4) 1 for determining other probabilities such as the probability of winning at the i-th bid, i.e., P(win at i-th bid), i ≥ 1. Indeed, these probabilities can be calculated by averaging individual columns from the infinite table. More specifically, using the law of total probability we have P(win at i-th bid) =
In order to gain intuition for the results of this calculation within our assumed parameter and distribution setting, we can observe the conditional probabilities appearing in the columns of Table 2 . Notice that the probabilities in column P n (1) are significantly larger than P n (2), P n (3)
etc. Recall that P n (1) is the probability that the first bid is accepted and is the largest out of n total bids given that N = n. This probability provides conditional information concerning the likelihood that the optimal policy tells us to accept the first bid and the first bid is largest.
The fact that these first four probabilities P 1 (1), . . . , P 4 (1) are significantly larger than the corresponding values in subsequent columns suggests that this behavior should also be true in the unconditional case, i.e., when N = n is not conditional information. Indeed, this would correctly correspond to intuition since we have assumed at the beginning of Section 4 that the first bid X 1 on average is larger than subsequent bids X n , n > 1. Since it is neither feasible nor practical to obtain all the entries of the infinite table, we will resort to simulation in order to quantify how confident we should be that we will obtain the largest bid when using the optimal policy τ * .
Simulation
Here we discuss a monte carlo simulation of our model. We use this simulation to compare results across different parameter assumptions for the bids. We begin with a brief description of the simulation.
Let M be the total number of simulations. Using a random number generator, we simulate . Using this information, we can compute the proportion of trials such that X τ * i = max{X 1 , . . . , X N i }; this yields an estimate of the probability of winning using the optimal strategy. For the j-th bid, we can compute the proportion of trials such that τ * i = j and X j is the largest of the bids in the i-th trial. Table 3 gathers probability estimates for the overall probability of winning using τ * , estimates of the probabilities that τ * = 1, 2 respectively and estimates of the probabilities of both stopping and winning at 1, 2 respectively. We estimate these probabilities (at the 95% confidence level) when X 1 ∼ Gamma(4, 4, 1, 70), X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 2 and in the iid case when X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 1. Additionally, we take N ∼ Poisson(λ = 4). Table 3 : Probability Estimates (m = 10 3 simulations): N ∼ Poisson(λ = 4), X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 2. Entries in the table correspond to estimates of the probability appearing in the associated column. The first row considers the case when the first bid arrives using a different distribution than subsequent bids. The entry corresponding to the first column in this row is the estimated probability ≈ 69% that the seller chooses the largest of all bids offered while using the optimal strategy. The corresponding entries in the second and third columns display the estimates of the probabilities ≈ 67.5%, 13.1% that the optimal strategy tells the seller to accept the first and second bid respectively. Finally the fourth and fifth columns present the probability estimates ≈ 54.9%, 7.7% that the optimal strategy tells the seller to accept the first or second bid and it is, in fact, the largest of all presented bids. The second row presents the probability estimates when all bids come from the same distribution, i.e., the iid case. Intervals below estimates are 95% confidence intervals.
The results in Table 3 comply with intuition. We find that the probability of accepting the largest bid using the optimal strategy is approximately 69%. Compare this to the lower bound 47.54% we determined in Table 2 . We note that this is substantially larger than the iid case where the probability is approximately 53%.
Remark 4. From Table 3 , we see that if, on average, the first bid is larger than subsequent bids, then the optimal strategy produces a greater likelihood of success. This is primarily due to the fact that the threshold x 1 does not change across the non-iid and iid cases. Thus, larger than average first bids increases the likelihood that the seller both accepts the first bid and the first bid is the largest of all bids. This is demonstrated in the fifth column of the table; compare 54.9% non-iid and 19.6% iid. Table 3 also shows the impact that the optimal strategy has on the likelihood of success across the two cases. More specifically, in the non-iid case, the probability of the event that the optimal strategy indicates to accept an offer and it is, in fact, the largest of all bids is significantly larger for the first bid relative to the second bid. This implies that the seller has much greater confidence that the accepted bid is the largest bid when τ * = 1 than when τ * = 2.
This makes good intuitive sense in the non-iid case since the first bid is, on average, larger but it is also interestingly true in the iid case; compare 19.6% and 15%.
This result of our theoretical model is in line with the empirical result of Merlo and OrtaloMagné (2004) who report that approximately 72% of all the transactions in their data set occur within the first match, and only 10% of all sales occur after three or more matches. Note also from Table 3 that the probability of accepting the first bid in our model is much closer to the 72% probability reported in Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) for the non-iid case than for the iid case, hence providing support for the property of our model that the distribution of the first bid is different from the distribution of the subsequent bids.
Likelihood of a Sale
In this paper, we incorporate into a real estate selling model the realistic risk facing the seller that if she rejects a current offer, there may be no future offers to entertain. Notice, if N ∼ Pois(λ), then there is a positive probability that time-on-the-market is infinite since P(N = 0) = e −λ > 0. As such, there is a nonzero possibility that the seller may not have any bids to entertain. Within such a modeling framework, the expected time-on-the-market is unhelpful information since it is infinite. Instead, we consider the likelihood that the asset is sold, i.e., P(τ * < ∞). This gives us the probability that the seller is offered a bid for the real estate asset and she accepts it at some point.
Using the optimal strategy we have identified, we calculate the probability that a sale occurs for alternative arrival rate of offers. An increase in the number of offers might be caused by a change in mortgage rates, GDP, supply of new units, or property taxes. Sample estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the probability of a sale under different arrival rates are reported in Table 4 . Table 4 : Sample values for P(τ * < ∞), m = 10 4 simulations: N ∼ Poisson(λ), X 1 ∼ Gamma(4, 4, 1, 70), X i ∼ Gamma(3, 3, 1, 70), i ≥ 2. We use z 97.5 since m = 10 4 is large and σ is the unbiased sample standard deviation. Table 4 shows an interesting trade off when it comes to the probability of a sale and the arrival rate of bids.
Remark 5. A higher number of bids can cause a decrease as well as an increase in the probability of a sale.
Prior to viewing the results, one might be inclined to believe that the probability of a sale occurring must be higher for a higher average number of bids. Surprisingly, this intuition is not necessarily true. Indeed, Table 4 highlight the delicate balance between the mean number of bids λ and the seller's optimal threshold acceptance values. Notice that when the average number of bids increases from λ = 2 to λ = 3, the first three threshold values for the seller increase from 75.8466, 70, 70 to 79.2731, 76.6714, 73 .1019, respectively. Knowledge of a higher average number of bids induces higher threshold values. These higher thresholds, in turn, decrease the likelihood of a sale taking place. This serves as an explanation for a lower sale probability in light of an increase in average number of bids, e.g., compare λ = 3; P(τ * < ∞) = 0.8342 with λ = 4; P(τ * < ∞) = 0.8167.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of a seller who seeks to maximize the probability of accepting the largest bid. The bids are random draws from a known distribution and the seller has to decide after each draw whether or not to accept the bid or wait for the arrival of a new bid.
Our contribution to the existing literature is two-fold. One is that we recognize that in many markets the seller has to decide whether to accept or reject a bid without knowing whether another bid would arrive. This is a departure from standard search models where the seller can always obtain another bid by incurring a search cost. The other contribution of our paper is that we consider the possibility that the first bid is distributionally different from all subsequent bids. This property of our model captures anecdotal evidence that first bids on real estate property tend to be larger than subsequent bids.
In this more complicated set up, we are able to solve for a simple optimal strategy for the seller. A distinguishing feature of our optimal strategy is its stochastic nature. In classical search theory, the optimal strategy is characterized by a deterministic non-increasing set of reservation prices. Within our framework, reservation prices are no longer deterministic. Rather, the optimal decision to accept a bid requires not only that the bid exceeds a certain threshold level, but it also needs to be greater than all past (random) bids received. In addition, we are able to calculate the probability of accepting the highest bid, estimate a confidence interval for this probability and show how it changes as the seller rejects a bid and waits for the arrival of a new bid. We also show than an improvement in market conditions that leads to a rise in the expected number of bids can lead to a decrease as well as to an increase in the probability of a sale.
A Appendix: Embedding within Prospect Theory?
Suppose there are three sequential offers for an asset which arrive independently and are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, i.e.,
Within this setup, we determine that the threshold values are x 1 = 0.6898, x 2 = 0.5, x 3 = 0.
The optimal policy is τ * = inf{n : X n = max{X 1 , . . . , X n } and X n ≥ x n }.
In words, the seller accepts the first offer which is both the largest of what has been previously offered and is at least as large as the threshold. Let y i denote a realization of the i-th offer. If the first offer y 1 is rejected (i.e., y 1 < x 1 ), then any smaller second offer (i.e., y 2 < y 1 ) will also be rejected even if y 2 exceeds the required threshold (i.e., y 2 ≥ x 2 ). This represents a "past visual illustration of this policy.
In order to see if we can embed our analysis within prospect theory, we consider the following situation: Suppose the first offer y 1 has been rejected and the seller must decide whether or not to accept the second offer y 2 . We seek a modified utility function (i.e., monotonically increasing, convex for losses, concave for gains etc) which satisfies the conditions of our optimal policy.
The three conditions that U (·) must satisfy are:
2. E[U (X 3 − y 2 )] ≥ U (y 2 − y 1 ), for any y 1 < y 2 and y 2 < 0.5.
3. E[U (X 3 − y 2 )] ≤ U (y 2 − y 1 ), for any y 1 < y 2 and y 2 ≥ 0.5.
In words, condition (1) says that the seller always prefers to wait for the third bid if the second offer is lower than the first offer. The value X 3 − y 1 represents the gain/loss of taking the third offer when y 1 ≥ y 2 . Condition (2) states that the seller always prefers to wait for the third bid when the second offer does not exceed the threshold x 2 = 0.5 even when there is a guaranteed perceived gain y 2 > y 1 . The value X 3 − y 2 represents the gain/loss of taking the third offer when y 1 < y 2 . Finally, condition (3) states that the seller prefers to accept y 2 for the property (with perceived gain of y 2 > y 1 ) when it meets or exceeds the threshold x 2 = 0.5 and is larger than the first offer y 1 .
Since (1) needs to hold for any y 2 ≤ y 1 , we must require that U (z) = −∞ for z < 0. If this property of U (·) did not hold, then we could always find y 2 close enough to y 1 such that
Intuitively, the restriction U (z) = −∞ for z < 0 corresponds to infinite loss aversion for the seller since it is optimal for the seller to never sell if there's a loss. Next, notice that condition (2) requires E[U (X 3 − y 2 )] > 0 when y 1 < y 2 < 0.5. But since U (z) = −∞ for z < 0 and P[X 3 − y 2 < 0] > 0, it must hold that E[U (X 3 − y 2 )] = −∞, a contradiction. Thus, we cannot find a function U (·) such that we can embed our model within prospect theory.
B Appendix: Technical Discussion Regarding Optimal Policy
The purpose of this section is to provide technical details sufficient for determining the optimal policy to our problem. It follows Porosiński (1987) and culminates in Theorem 1 in Section 3).
where E (n,x) denotes the expected value with respect to P (n,x) (·) = p(n, x; ·). From the general theory of optimal stopping (e.g. Shiryaev (1979) ), it is known that s 0 (n, x) satisfies s 0 (n, x) = max{f 0 (n, x), P 0 s 0 (n, x)}, where
Definition 1. The set := {e ∈ E : s 0 (e) = f 0 (e)} is known as the stopping set.
Again, from general theory of optimal stopping, we know that the stopping time τ 0 := inf{n ∈ N : Y n ∈ } is optimal only if τ 0 < ∞ almost surely, i.e., with probability one. Note that since our Markov chain attains the state δ almost surely (note f 0 (δ) = 0 = s 0 (δ)), we can conclude that τ 0 is optimal for (P'). Thus, an investigation into the stopping set will lead to an understanding of the optimal strategy. To simplify notation, let
Transforming (2), we have
With these definitions, note that
Now with (8) and (9), we have a helpful characterization of (n, x) ∈ ⇔ s(n, x) = f (n, x) ≥ P s(n, x),
Additionally, we can write the backward induction formulas
Using the above results, we can obtain a further characterization of . Since for each fixed n, the function f (n, x) is non-decreasing, the function P s(n, x) is non-increasing and f (n, ∞) = π n ,
Therefore, we can write
Notice that k(n, x) ≥ 0 for (n, x) ∈ . In what follows, shall see that the values of c(n, x) are an important determinant of the structure of . Given the relationship between k(n, x) and d(n, x), an understanding of the structure of d(n, x) will assist in the characterization of . We can begin an investigation into the function d(n, x) by understanding its interaction with when fixing one of its parameters. Indeed, for fixed x ∈ (−∞, ∞), consider the x-cross section (x) := {n ∈ N : (n, x) ∈ }. If we consider situations when, for each fixed x ∈ (−∞, ∞), the number of sign changes of (d(n, x)) ∞ n=−1 equals 1, we are then able to relate the optimal stopping time for (P') to the first entrance time of the Markov chain Y into a closed subset in E. Instances when (d(n, x)) ∞ n=−1 changes sign only once are referred to as monotone cases. Below, we consider three distributions with the monotone property and prove the optimal strategy for the seller.
B.1 Monotone Cases
B.1.1 One-Point Distribution.
In this situation, we suppose P(N = n) = 1. Then, d(k, x) < 0 for k < n, d(n, x) > 0 and
∞ k=−1 changes sign exactly once.
B.1.2 The Uniform Distribution on {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Note that in this case, d(0, x) < 0, d(n, x) = 1/n, d(k, x) = 0 for k > n and the sequence
Thus, (d(k, x)) ∞ k=−1 changes sign exactly once.
B.1.3 Poisson Distribution with parameter λ.
If we assume that F is absolutely continuous, then using integration by parts (to obtain the second equality below) we have
Since a(k, x) is a decreasing function of k for fixed x, we can conclude that (d(k, x)) ∞ k=−1 changes sign exactly once.
B.2 Optimal Stopping under Monotone Case
The following lemma presented in Porosiński (1987) provides a solution to our problem and will be instrumental in proving Theorem 1 of our paper.
be a homogeneous Markov chain on (Ω, F, P) with state space (E, P) and let p(e; B) = P(Y n+1 ∈ B|Y n = e) for B ∈ B. Let f 0 : E → R be a bounded function. Let Γ := {e ∈ E : f 0 (e) ≥ P 0 f 0 (e)},
where P 0 is defined in (2). If (i) p(e; Γ) = 1 for e ∈ Γ, (ii) σ Γ < ∞ almost surely, then σ Γ is an optimal stopping time for Y with reward f 0 .
We are now in a position to prove the optimal strategy of Theorem 1 for our paper.
Theorem. If Assumption 1 holds and the sequence (d(k, n)) ∞ k=−1 changes sign once for each fixed x, then the solution to (P) exists and the stopping time
is optimal for (P) where x n is the least root of the equation
Proof. This proof proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 2 in Porosiński (1987) but we include it here for completeness. Note that Γ = {e ∈ E : f 0 (e) ≥ P 0 f 0 (e)} and (n, x) ∈ Γ is equivalent
a non-decreasing function (see (13)) for n fixed. Using the monotone property, the sequence d(h, y), for each y, changes sign at most once which implies that d(h, y) ≥ 0 for h ≥ n and y ≥ x. Then, by (12) k(h, x) ≥ 0, i.e., (h, x) ∈ Γ for h ≥ n and y ≥ x. Hence, k(h, y) ≥ 0 or equivalently (h, y) ∈ Γ for h ≥ n and y ≥ x. Now we show that k(n, x) ≥ 0 implies k(n, y) ≥ 0 for y ≥ x. Let k(n, x) ≥ 0. Since k(n, ∞) = π n ≥ 0, there exists an x such that k(n, x) ≥ 0. Now suppose there exists y > x such that k(n, y) < 0. Then, it must be the case that d(n, y) < 0 (since (n, y) ∈ Γ otherwise as shown above) and hence d(n, x) < 0 also, since d(n, ·) is non-decreasing.
Let d(m, x) < 0 for m = n, . . . , n + s and d(n + s + 1, x) ≥ 0 for some s ≥ 0. From (12), we know that k(n, x) = d(n, x) + F (x)k(n + 1, x).
Since k(n, x) ≥ 0 and d(n, x) < 0, we know from above that k(n + 1, x) > 0. Repeating this iteratively for values k(n + 2, x), . . . , k(n + s, x), we obtain k(n + s, x) = d(n + s, x) + F (x)d(n + s + 1, x) + (F (x)) 2 d(n + s + 2, x) + · · · > 0.
Recall that d(h, y) is a nondecreasing function for each h. Additionally, d(h, x) ≥ 0 for h ≥ n + s + 1 (notice this uses the monotonicity assumption here). Hence, 0 < k(n + s, x) ≤ k(n + s, y), k(n + s − 1, x) ≤ d(n + s − 1, x) + xk(n + s, y) ≤ k(n + s − 1, y).
Now repeating this operation several times yields k(n, x) ≤ k(n, y) which is a contradiction to our supposition that k(n, y) < 0. Thus, we have k(n, x) ≥ 0 for x ≤ x n and k(n, x) < 0 for
x < x n where x n = inf{x : k(n, x) ≥ 0}. Since δ ∈ Γ, we can conclude that Γ has the form
We now show that (x n ) ∞ n=1 is non-increasing. It suffices to show that (n, x) ∈ Γ implies (n + 1, x) ∈ Γ for each n ∈ N and x ∈ [R, ∞). Assume that k(n, x) ≥ 0. If d(n, x) ≥ 0, then d(n + 1, x) ≥ 0 also and thus (n + 1, x) ∈ Γ. If d(n, x) < 0, then from (15), we have that k(n + 1, x) > 0 and hence (n + 1, x) ∈ Γ. Therefore, (x n ) ∞ n=1 is non-increasing. Now, since (x n ) ∞ n=1 is non-increasing along with the fact that our Markov chain Y "goes to the right and upward" we know that assumption (i) of Lemma 1 holds. Additionally, since Y attains the state δ almost surely, we also know that assumption (ii) of Lemma 1 holds. Thus, we can apply the lemma and the proof concludes.
C Appendix: Numerical Results: One-point and Uniform total bids
In our paper, we examined optimal strategy under the assumption that the number of bids was Poisson distributed. Here, we characterize the optimal strategy τ * and the probability of accepting the largest bid offer when: N ∼ One-point{n} and N ∼ Uniform{1, . . . , n}.
C.1 One-point distributed total bids C.1.1 Threshold values: x n Here, we suppose that P[N = n] = 1. From Section B.1.1, we can apply Theorem ?? and calculate the optimal threshold offer, 1 ≤ k ≤ n using d k = F −1 (b k ), where b k := u n−(k−1) and u i is the threshold for the i-th bid when the bids are uniformly distributed. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) provide approximations for b i (which is independent of n) for which we use to obtain values in Table 5 below. Note that d k = x n−(k−1) , k = 1, . . . , n. According to Table 5 , we only accept a bid X n if it is at least as big as both d n and what has already been presented. Note that we only accept a bid X k if it is at least as big as both d n−k+1
and what has already been presented. For example, when presented with the second-to-last bid (i.e., X n−1 has been presented) the optimal threshold value is d 2 = 78.0222. Thus, we only accept X n−1 if it is at least the median of the distribution of the final bid X n . Notice that the distribution F 1 plays no role in determining d 2 .
C.1.2 Probability of accepting the largest bid
Here, we use equation (6) to obtain in Table 6 the probability of accepting the largest bid when the number of bids is known with certainty to be n = 1, 2, 3, and 4. n P(win) P n (1) P n (2) P n (3) P n (4 Here, we consider the case when the number of bids N is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , n}, i.e., p k = 1/n for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. From Section B.1.2, we can apply Theorem 1 and calculate the optimal threshold offer. Again, we can calculate the optimal threshold offer, 1 ≤ k ≤ n using d k = F −1 (b k ), where b k := u n−(k−1) and u i is the threshold for the i-th bid when the bids are uniformly distributed. Porosiński (1987) page 305 shows that b k is independent of n. As in the one-point distribution case, we only accept a bid X k if it is at least as big as both d n−k+1 and what has already been presented. Notice that when at most one bid remains (i.e., X n−1 has been presented) the optimal threshold value is d 2 = 70. This may seem counterintuitive at first but is true due to the fact that, when N is uniformly distributed, there is a possibility that N equals n − 1, i.e., X n−1 may be the last bid presented. For a given value of X n−1 , say x, the event that x is the largest of the bids can result from there being no future bids or it can result from it being larger than the final bid (if there is one). This effectively lowers the threshold below its value when N has a one-point distribution.
C.2.2 Probability of accepting the largest bid
Here, we use equation (6) to obtain in Table 8 the probability of accepting the largest bid when the number of bids is uniformly distributed between 1 and n with n = 1, 2, 3, and 4. n P(win) P n (1) P n (2) P n (3) P n (4 
